Op-ed article in NY Times refers to Greek junta

In this op-ed article published a few days ago, The Nation's Maria Margaronis uses a couple of references to the Greek Colonels' regime to demonstrate that Greece has reached a boiling point. The author maintains that, while Europe was viewed as a 'source of hope' in the 1960s and 1970s, it is now perceived as 'turning up the heat' in Greece.

Here's the relevant extract from the article:

"The coalition government of New Democracy’s Antonis Samaras is becoming more and more authoritarian, passing laws by decree and pandering to the agenda of the far-right party, Golden Dawn. References to the junta of 1967-1974 are no longer the sole province of left-wing rhetoric.

The sudden closure of the state TV and radio broadcaster ERT last month, without any debate or vote in Parliament, brought back memories of tanks and martial music for many who would normally reject such crude comparisons.

In the seven years of the colonels’ dictatorship, many Greeks looked to Europe as a source of hope. Some of Europe’s civil bodies have indeed come to democracy’s defense. But the European Union’s political and financial institutions and their partners in the International Monetary Fund are interested only in the bottom line, piling on pressure to plug holes in the balance sheet regardless of the cost to human life and civil liberties.

[...]  During the dictatorship, Europe appeared to be a safe place outside the pot.
Now, Europe itself is turning up the heat."

Former Greek diplomat on possibility of 1967-style coup

Here's a very interesting article based on an interview with a former Greek diplomat.

According to the the New Statesman, 'Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos was a career diplomat with the Greek foreign ministry. As a junior officer with the service in the 1970s, he helped assure the then freshly democratic nation's accession to the European Union (at the time the EEC). He was at different times Athens' ambassador to Poland, Albania and Canada, and finally the director general of EU Affairs in the ministry.'

Chrysanthopoulos - from 99getsmart.com

Chrysanthopoulos discredited the possibility of a repetition of a military coup (like the one in 1967) in Greece, for the following reason:

There is some good news however that he hears from the contacts he maintains amongst his former colleagues and politicians. He is confident that there will be no military coup, as there was in 1967.

“There are contacts by certain politicians with elements in the armed forces to guarantee that in the event of major social unrest, the army will not intervene.”

“I don't want to go into too much detail here though as it is a delicate issue,” he continues. “But as a result of these contacts, I think this is going to be successful.”

Harold Wilson and Hugh Greene

Today's Daily Telegraph features an interesting opinion article on 'Harold Wilson Night' by the paper's former editor and authorised biographer of Margaret Thatcher, Charles Moore.

Here's an excerpt of the article which refers to Wilson's relationship with BBC Director-General at the time (and head of London-based resistance organisation European Atlantic Action Committee on Greece) Hugh Greene:

http://www.geni.com

No one but the BBC would have dreamt up a “Harold Wilson Night”. It is hard to think of any other politician who was at the top for so long (he won four general elections) with so little to show for it. But it is fitting that the BBC should have commemorated the 50th anniversary of Wilson’s capture of the Labour leadership because, at the time, it loved him.

In the general election of 1964, Wilson spotted that the BBC comedy Steptoe and Son would be broadcast on polling day. Believing that the programme (about father-and-son rag-and-bone men) was particularly popular with Labour voters, and would therefore keep them away from the polling stations, Wilson went to see Hugh Greene, the director-general, to persuade him to reschedule. Greene, who craved a Labour victory, obliged. Since Wilson’s overall majority was only four seats, it is possible that it was the Beeb wot won it.

Mario Modiano, former Times correspondent in Athens dies

Sad news as former Times correspondent in Athens, Mario Modiano, died at 86.

According to ekathimerini.com:

'Modiano was a well-known chronicler of some of the key moments of Greek history, such as the military dictatorship, the restoration of democracy and the separation of Cyprus'.

He was not loved by the junta because he related in great detail cases of systematic torture of jailed opponents.

You can find an obituary written in The Times, here - and another one, published in the Daily Telegraph, here.

You can read a very interesting interview of his, where he recounts the story of his family's arrival to Greece, as well as his personal experience of the German occupation and the Greek Colonels' regime, here.

A more in depth account of the events immediately after the collapse of the regime can be found in this article he wrote a year ago.

Modiano in Greece - telegraph.co.uk

In this excerpt from my forthcoming book, you can see how Modiano, talking to British officials well before the 1973 Greek republic referendum, predicted, with uncanny precision, the exact percentage of the people who would vote 'Yes' to the constitutional changes.

The fact that both foreign journalists and the British Embassy could so easily provide a accurate estimate of the result well in advance speaks volumes about the genuineness of the referendum.

The last important event of [1973's] ‘pretty gruelling summer’, as far as the domestic scene of Greece was concerned, was the referendum on the amended Greek constitution.

The junta had warned the British that they should not judge the referendum by British standards and members of the international press had expressed the certainty that it would be ‘a farce’. Mario Modiano [...] thought that the decision to abolish the monarchy had been taken a long time ago, told the British that the Colonels would not permit a repeat of the results of the 1968 plebiscite, in order to make them appear genuine: ‘If as seems likely they fudged the figures, they were likely to choose a more plausible percentage (like for example 78%)’ (emphasis added).

This was also the opinion of some FCO officials who had realized, as early as in June 1973, that there was ‘little doubt as to the outcome of the referendum, although the government, who were believed to be embarrassed by the very high yes-votes in 1968, might prefer a rather smaller percentage in their favour this time’.

The British conceded that it was ‘very easy’ to predict the outcome of the referendum, with the Colonels still controlling the levers of power and not being able to afford to lose.

[...] As [British official J F R] Martin admitted shortly before the referendum, ‘few observers doubt that the figure has been decided in advance to within a few per cent’.

Polling took place on 29 July to approve the new republican constitution and the appointment of Papadopoulos as president (reserving for him exclusive powers over defence, foreign affairs and internal security) and Angelis as vice-president.

The final results showed that ‘yes’ got the 78.4% of the vote, which was considered ‘a respectable looking percentage’ in London.

The British embassy’s own estimate had been 78% (emphasis added).

UK and Human Rights abroad (continued)

Following up on yesterday's blog post on UK and Human Rights abroad, the Financial Times has published an editorial on the subject today, entitled 'Rights in Bahrain'.

The concluding paragraph shows how little things have changed since the 1970s, as Britain was also accused of double standards in its dealings with the Greek dictatorship.

According to the paper,

"The art of foreign relations for any open democracy is to balance defence of human rights with other national interests. Britain has been accused of getting the balance wrong in Bahrain, where repression is a daily presence.

The criticism, made in a parliamentary report, is valid – but only in part. When Bahrain’s government brutally cracked down on anti-regime demonstrators in 2011, leaving 35 dead, the UK was one of the first to protest publicly despite important trade and security links. It is also a behind-the-scenes player in efforts to promote dialogue between the ruling Sunni elite and Shia majority. The US, perhaps with one eye on its naval base in Bahrain, appears to be less involved than in the past, so Britain’s role has become key. Mediators are often more effective if criticism stays behind closed doors.

Nonetheless, parliamentarians are right to say that the UK needs to be more assertive. The softly-softly approach has not delivered results. The difficulty is that the Al Khalifa royal family is itself divided and hardliners have managed to stymie political reform. [...]

Britain, meanwhile, has to be more up front about the conflicts it faces in pursuing national interests. The criteria by which it judges the gravity of human rights failings in ally countries need to be more clearly explained. That is the only way to avoid being accused of double standards."

UK and Human Rights abroad

As you can see by reading this article that was published today on the BBC NEWS website,
The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has accused the UK government  of inconsistency in its dealings with other countries over human rights.

According to the BBC:

The committee accepted it was "inevitable" that there would be occasional conflicts between the UK's strategic, commercial or security-related interests and its human rights values and a "balance" had to be struck.

The report reads: "In our view, it would be in the government's interest for it to be more transparent in acknowledging that there will be contradictions in pursuing these interests while promoting human rights values.

The government's role should be publicly to set out and explain its judgements on how far to balance the two in particular cases, having taken into account the need to adapt policy according to local circumstances and developments."

You can find the full report (as well as FCO's response) here.

The 2011 report mentioned above focuses on the UK's (apparently inconsistent) dealings with Ukraine and Bahrain.

If you're interested in some historical context, the British government's 'inconsistency' in relation to the case of the Greek Colonels' regime is highlighted in my forthcoming book.

To give you an idea, this is from the conclusion of the first chapter (pp. 41-42):

"All in all, the British stance towards the dictatorship of the Colonels, during the first two years could be characterised as one of ambiguity.  

London hesitated in almost every decision it had to take, oscillating between the two poles of its policy: namely, (1) protecting its mainly commercial and strategic interests and its ‘special relationship’ with Washington, and (2) upholding human rights and promoting a return to democratic rule, basically through trying to influence the regime and sustaining some efforts of the opposition. The initial inertia of the Labour government soon changed to a pragmatic policy of establishing relations with the junta, without, however, appearing to be too close to Greece’s military dictators. The catalyst for this change were three events that took place in 1967; the Six Day War, the crisis in Cyprus, and the failed royal counter-coup. The first demonstrated Greece’s augmented significance as a NATO ally in a troubled region, the second proved to the British the value of keeping closer relations with the Greek leaders, and the third confirmed the consolidation of the regime. When 1968 came and Britain recognized the junta anew, it became clear that, despite some instances of criticism of the dictatorship -mainly for public consumption- London was willing to make use of ‘different tactics’ in order to safeguard its (chiefly commercial and strategic) interests vis-à-vis Greece. The impact of international events was once again decisive as the Prague Spring and increased Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean were conducive to a reconsideration of British policy towards the Colonels and the adoption of a ‘business as usual’ approach, thus acting as a prelude to the new era of relations that was soon to follow."

UK Arms Export Policy- Now and then

The Committees on Arms Export Controls has published today a report saying that the UK government should apply significantly more cautious judgements on the export of arms to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression.

Taken from conservatives.com

The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley (who firstly became an MP a few months before the junta's fall in 1974) said:

"This is a ground breaking Report in the depth and detail of the Committees on Arms Export Controls' scrutiny of the Government’s policies on arms exports.

The Foreign Secretary in his Oral evidence to the Committee confirmed that the British Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression was as follows:

The long-standing British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."

This reminded me of the situation vis-a-vis providing arms to the Greek dictatorship of the 1960s-1970s.

Recently released FCO documents reveal that during the discussions of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 30 January 1969 on arms policy towards Greece, it was decided that Britain ‘should in principle permit the supply to Greece of arms which she could reasonably be expected to require in order to fulfil her NATO role’ and that only the supply of those arms intended to repress the civilian population should be prohibited.

But how exactly did Whitehall handle this conundrum?

Here's how I analyse it in my forthcoming book (pp. 246-7):

Arms sales to Greece was [a] highly controversial issue-no less so due to prior complications over trade with South Africa. The Wilson government drew a distinction (similar to the one employed vis-à-vis the apartheid regime), whereby large items which could be used for NATO purposes, such as tanks, could be exported, whereas ‘light’ items, like grenades and small rifles, which could be used for internal repression could not be sold to Athens. The Labour government tried to handle this delicate and potentially explosive question in strict confidence, thus exemplifying its twofold policy of keeping relations with the Colonels on a satisfactory level and at the same time avoiding hostile criticism, especially within parliament. This ‘combination of high-minded principle and arms sales’, as one member of the Cabinet termed it, provided an impetus for attacks on Whitehall (for the most part from its left wing), which defended its choices by returning to the Leitmotif of the dismal financial situation of Britain that was in desperate need of exports, and the importance of the arms industry with regard to the jobs it provided.



FCO photo taken from news.bbc.co.uk

Consequently, when the Conservatives came to power, a continuation of the status quo concerning arms sales was the minimum expected. In fact, the Heath government used its predecessor’s policy as a springboard for the active promotion of sales in order to boost its trade with Greece. London made its desire to sell arms to the junta more distinct, by arranging the exchange of visits of people involved, on a variety of levels, in arms sales. Most importantly, British ministers kept reiterating their willingness to provide frigates and, after an initial numbness, even tanks to the military dictatorship in Athens, in a policy that culminated in Lord Carrington’s visit to the Greek capital. Despite Whitehall’s active policy of attracting arms deals, sales seldom materialized. FCO documents reveal that the British attributed that to the ‘Byzantine style of negotiations’ of the Greeks and their unwillingness to appear to ‘go other than American’. Greek documents show that the junta was more interested in appearing to be in negotiations with the British (in order to enhance its international respectability) than proceed with sales, for the additional reason that, in the most significant cases (such as the frigates), Athens lacked the necessary funds. Therefore, while Britain was preoccupied with supporting its arms industry and generally improving its trade in a desperate effort to reverse its financial decline, the Greeks’ main concern was to use any contracts secured for political exploitation.

British press on Greek crisis refers to junta

As Greece continues to make headlines because of the financial and political crisis it is facing, references to the Greek Colonels' regime keep springing up.

The latest articles to mention the dictatorship appeared in the British press yesterday:

In this The Times article, a Greek expert is asked about the possibility of a repeat of the 1967 coup:



Dr Dokos - Photo taken from http://www.belgradeforum.org

One worst-case outcome does look so remote that it is all but excluded by experts: a military coup establishing a dictatorship like the junta that ended in 1974.

Mr Dokos of ELIAMEP has taught in military academies. “If you ask me if there will be any move by the military, I would tell you ‘no’,” he said. “I think they are too democratically indoctrinated for 38 years now.”

 While, in this article that appeared in The Guardian, a 29-year-old enterpreneur explains his decision to return to his native Greece to set up a consultancy:

"At the moment, we don't really see a light at the end of the tunnel," he says. "There should always be a light. Even during the [Nazi] occupation there was a light. During the [colonels'] dictatorship there was a light. Now there's not. That's why I'm staying here. To find a light."

FT article on geopolitical ramifications of Greek election

In this article the Financial Times Europe editor claims that the stakes in Sunday's Greek election are 'geopolitical rather than financial'.

Both New Democracy and Syriza's flirting with Russia and other non-EU, non-NATO countries, as well as the 'disarray of Greece's foreign ministry', are highlighted.

Tony Barber - taken from http://stateoftheunion.eui.eu/

This proposed re-orientation (or 'diversification' if you like) of Greek foreign policy (to the extent it is put forward and to the degree it is possible) is reminiscent of an era, up until now considered long gone, when Greece was outside the EU and was facing isolation from the West.

Tony Barber points to the Greeks' disillusionment with the West by making a reference to the Greek junta:

Although younger Greeks are proud of their modern European identity, half of them today are unemployed and fearful for their future. Older Greeks, meanwhile, remember Nato’s decision to stay on the sidelines when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 – as well as what they recall as US support for the 1967-74 Greek military junta.

ECHR President warns Britain could end up like Greece under the Colonels

This is an entry from a Guardian blog back in February 2011, drawing a parallel between respect for human rights in Britain today and the Greece of the Colonels.

The entry, entitled 'David Cameron warned Britain could end up like Greece under the colonels', was wrutten by Nicholas Watt and quotes the president of the European Court of Human Rights making the following reference to the Colonels' regime:

"So the president of the European Court of Human Rights found himself under fire tonight from Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans after suggesting that Britain will look like Greece under the rule of the colonels if it refuses to abide by the court's ruling on prisoners.

Photo taken from http://federation-pro-europa-christiana.org/

Jean-Paul Costa drew the parallel with the colonels' dictatorship of 1967-74 when he was asked by the BBC what would happen if Britain withdrew from the court or refused to abide by its ruling on prisoners. The comments by the Tunisian-born French president came a week after MPs voted overwhelmingly to uphold the blanket ban which prevents prisoners from voting. The court ruled last October that Britain had to lift the ban.

This is what Costa said when he was asked what would happen if Britain abandoned the European Convention on Human Rights or refused to abide by the European Court of Human Rights ruling on prisoners. Costa told Shirin Wheeler, the presenter of the BBC Parliament programme The Record Europe:

I would say that it would be a disaster. A disaster certainly for the Council of Europe and the court but also a disaster for the United Kingdom. I say it respectfully. The UK was one of the states founding the convention, one of the founding states of the Council.
[The] UK has always been a supporter for the court and many times model for the legal systems of other countries. Many systems took advantage through the case law of our court of the legal traditions of Britain.

Wheeler asked why it would be a disaster for Britain. Costa said:

For the image of Britain I will say a simple things and again I hope this will not be considered as not respectful. The only country which denounced the convention actually was Greece in 1967 at the time of dictatorship of the Colonels. Of course after seven years, when democracy was restored in Greece, Greece returned to the Council of Europe and the convention.

I cannot imagine – even if I can understand some irritation that [the] UK which is a great country I admire the UK – could be in the same situation as the Colonels in 1967."

Mazower article in FT

On the same day (25/05/2012), FT published another article that referred to the Greek junta.


This time it is an article by distinguished British historian Mark Mazower who has written extensively on Greece.


Professor Mazower won a Runciman Award in 2005 for his extremely interesting book 'Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews' at a ceremony where I was given the London Hellenic Society prize for my MA dissertation, which formed the basis of my research on Anglo-Greek relations in the late 1960s and mid 1970s.


In this article Prof Mazower wrote the following:

"Here, the fight against today’s perceived enemy – neoliberalism – evokes the struggle against the military junta 40 years ago, and the resistance to Nazi occupation during the second world war."

FT article mentions Greek fear of being 'thrown back to the time of the Colonels'

In this FT article about the rising numbers of Greek residents in Britain applying for UK citizenship, in light of a possible exit of Greece from the eurozone (see, for example, this Economist article), a reference to the Greek Colonels' regime was made.

It was Vicky Price, a Greek-born City economist and former senior adviser to the government, who, according to the newspaper, said the following:

"Greeks have a great wish to belong to Europe because they are surrounded by what was the former Soviet Union. The idea of being cast adrift is terrible for them because it would imply they would be thrown back to the time of the colonels in the 1970s."

The Times article on Wilson's Britain, 1967-1970

I've come across this interesting article by Fay Weldon, who gives a very vivid picture of life in Britain (ok, mostly London) under Harold Wilson.

She concentrates on the 1967-1970 period, when the Labour government coincided with the Greek Colonels' regime.

The title of the article that appeared in The Times (22/05/2012) is aptly called ‘The white heat of Wilson’s new technology proved too hot to handle’.

Here's a short clip of PM Wilson in 1967:

And here's a clip of London during the so-called 'Swinging Sixties' to give you a part of the atmosphere of the time:

The ghost of the Colonels by Adam Curtis

About a month ago, Adam Curtis (pictured) published this entry on his BBC blog.
It is an excellent piece and it connects the current financial situation of Greece with the
Greek Colonels' dictatorship.

Among the gems included are a really fascinating report by Panorama's John Morgan, and the film
Greece - The Seven Black Years, which manages to give a clear picture (and in colour!) of what life under the regime was like.
It is a remarkable film and a wonderful source for those interested in developing an in-depth understanding of the dictatorship.

'Back to the 1960s'

Another entry that is connected to the Greek debt crisis.

Yesterday, a Greek minister (by a strange twist of fate bearing the same name as the Greek dictator's brother and regime official) made a comparison between the current financial situation in Athens and the one around the time of the Greek Colonels' regime, and expressed the opinion that Greece's exit from the eurozone would lead the country 40 to 50 years back.

According to BBC News:

'Greece's minister for international economic relations, Constantine Papadopoulos, said leaving the euro would be "catastrophic" for Greece.

"I personally think [leaving the eurozone] would take us back to the 1960s or 1970s,"he told the BBC's Andrew Marr programme.

He later clarified that he was not referring to the political situation at the time, when the military took power in a coup, but the standards of living and the structure of the economy.'

Here's the full article.


And here you can see an interview he gave to SKY NEWS more recently:

Britain and the junta: 40 years ago II

Here's the article on Anglo-Greek relations in 1970, in English this time:

Britain and Greece: 40 years ago
By Alexandros Nafpliotis*

‘If a member of a club breaks the rules for a limited period, the other members may tolerate it but if he is in persistent violation of the rules, the time must come when the club can no longer accept the situation. My government, with great reluctance, has come to the conclusion that this is the situation we are faced with now’

George Thompson (Britain’s chief delegate to CoE), 11 December 1969

The timetable presented by a Greek minister failed to persuade European allies of the intentions of the Greek government. Western European governments are toughening their stance vis-à-vis Greece, which is now forced to look for support in other areas of the globe. The Greek prime minister, who has also taken over the post of minister of foreign affairs, is struggling to take the country out of the ‘vulnerable international position’ it is in, and which does not leave it much room for manoeuvre. In his effort to achieve this he encounters strong reactions from members of his government, who disagree with his initiatives in trying to mitigate foreign critics through pursuing a conciliatory line.

Meanwhile, Britain is preparing for a crucial election, which is very likely to reinstate the Conservatives to the leadership of the country after a long period of Labour dominance. It is considered certain that the Tories’ return to power will impact considerably on London’s relations with Brussels and other major European capitals. The leader of the party assumed the responsibility of dramatically changing the party’s profile and competing with the charismatic Labour leader five years ago.

All of the above refer to the situation in Athens and London not in 2010 but exactly 40 years ago. The third anniversary of the 21 April coup d’etat that brought the Colonels to power was overshadowed by the feeling of isolation that the regime was increasingly experiencing. This was mainly a consequence of Greece’s walkout (when it realised that expulsion was imminent) from the Council of Europe, the previous December. George Papadopoulos (prime minister, minister of defence, and, from the summer on, also minister of foreign affairs) launched the regime’s ‘opening into the East’, in order to enhance the international standing of Greece, which had taken some serious blows. The hardliners of the junta reacted to Papadopoulos’ concentration of powers, and to his handling of the situation in Cyprus. In the summer of 1970, Edward Heath completely unexpectedly became premier, as he led the Conservatives to one of the biggest electoral surprises in British history, and set Britain’s accession to the EEC as his primary goal.
The return of the Tories in power created great expectations on the part of the junta, mainly because of the lack of a left wing within the Conservative party and the great interest that the Tories traditionally show for matters of defence and security. The newspaper Nea Politia (the mouthpiece of the regime), immediately pointed out the importance of the electoral outcome, claiming that the British election results ‘show that the swing towards the left in Europe is being halted’ and that these developments ‘vindicate the 1967 Revolution and show that the Greek officers who launched it were the first to understand the message of [the] times’. This was followed by positive statements by British officials (stressing the fact that the Conservative party did not have a left wing) that contributed to an amelioration of relations. London, under tremendous pressure formed by its financial difficulties and US insistence, decided that it was necessary to have a ‘good working relationship’ with the Greek military regime that would allow Britain to actively promote trade (including arms sales) between the two countries.

The tension that was created in the Mediterranean in September 1970, strengthened Greece’s position, as it underlined its significance for the Atlantic Alliance and seemed to justify the British argument in favour of working closely with Athens and avoiding discussing the ‘Greek issue’ in NATO at all cost. The meeting that took place at Geoffrey Rippon’s office at the end of the month is quite indicative of the Heath government’s intentions. The record of this meeting epitomised British policy towards the Colonels under the Conservative party, as it provided a perfect illustration of the priorities of Whitehall, its position on a series of sensitive issues, and, finally, marked a watershed with regard to Anglo-Greek relations in some respects. It was decided that ‘co-operation with Greece in the military field was particularly important if we were to maintain a good working relationship with the Greek Government’ and it was stated that ‘HMG’s recent agreement to the supply of frigates should prove helpful in this connexion’. The new spirit in relations was further proven by Palamas’ (Greek alternate minister of foreign affairs) visit to the British capital and Sir Denis Greenhill’s (permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs) statement that his country wished to do ‘as much business as possible with Greece’, as well as by the Palamas –Douglas-Home meeting in New York in October.

Despite a relative fluctuation in relations between the two countries (that chiefly had to do with difficulties bequeathed by Wilson), the Heath government made clear its will to establish warmer relations, by drawing a distinction between its policy and that of its predecessor, and by using cooperation in the military field as the catalyst. 1970 is a milestone in Anglo-Greek relations as it is the starting-point of a Tory policy towards the Greek junta that, however, was to bear more fruit in the following years of their tenure. The prevalent aspect of this policy was the cynicism with which London and its representatives in Athens seemed to accept the situation in Greece. The following year, the British ambassador in Greece, Sir Robin Hooper sent a report to FCO stating this:

‘I do not see Greece returning to a democratic system of government as understood in Western European countries for many years and evolution even to a form of guided democracy such as the colonels have in the past seemed to envisage is evidently going to be slow and uncertain’.

*Alexandros Nafpliotis holds a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics and is currently writing a book on Britain and the Greek Colonels, 1967-1974.

Britain and the junta: 40 years ago

Here's an article (in Greek) on the similarities between the situation in Athens and London today, and back in 1970.

Χούντα και Βρετανία: 40 χρόνια πριν
του Αλέξανδρου Ναυπλιώτη*

«Αν κάποιο μέλος μιας ένωσης αψηφά τους κανόνες για μια περιορισμένη περίοδο τα άλλα μέλη μπορούν να το ανεχθούν· αν όμως παραβιάζει συνεχώς τους κανόνες, τότε πρέπει κάποια στιγμή να πάψει η ένωση να δέχεται αυτή την κατάσταση. Η κυβέρνησή μου, με μεγάλη απροθυμία, έφθασε στο συμπέρασμα πως τέτοια είναι η κατάσταση που αντιμετωπίζουμε τώρα».
George Thompson (Υπουργός άνευ χαρτοφυλακίου στην κυβέρνηση Wilson), 11 Δεκεμβρίου 1969

Το χρονοδιάγραμμα που παρουσίασε κορυφαίος υπουργός δεν κατάφερε να πείσει τους Ευρωπαίους εταίρους για τις προθέσεις της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης. Οι Δυτικοευρωπαϊκές κυβερνήσεις σκληραίνουν τη στάση τους απέναντι στην Ελλάδα, η οποία είναι αναγκασμένη πια να αναζητήσει ερείσματα σε άλλες περιοχές του πλανήτη. Ο Έλληνας πρωθυπουργός, έχοντας αναλάβει και καθήκοντα Υπουργού Εξωτερικών, προσπαθεί να βγάλει την χώρα από την «ευάλωτη διεθνώς θέση» στην οποία έχει περιέλθει και που δεν της αφήνει μεγάλο περιθώριο ελιγμών. Στην προσπάθειά του αυτή συναντά ισχυρές εσωτερικές αντιδράσεις από μέλη της κυβέρνησής του που δε συμφωνούν με τη συμβιβαστική γραμμή που φαίνεται να ακολουθεί ο πρωθυπουργός σε σχέση με τους ξένους επικριτές της Ελλάδας.
Το ίδιο διάστημα η Βρετανία ετοιμάζεται για μια κρίσιμη εκλογική αναμέτρηση που είναι πιθανόν να επαναφέρει στο τιμόνι της χώρας τους Συντηρητικούς ύστερα από μια μακρά περίοδο κυριαρχίας των Εργατικών. Θεωρείται βέβαιο ότι η επιστροφή των Τόρηδων στην εξουσία θα επηρεάσει σημαντικά τις σχέσεις του Λονδίνου με τις Βρυξέλλες και τις άλλες μεγάλες ευρωπαϊκές πρωτεύουσες. Ο αρχηγός του κόμματος εκλέχθηκε στην ηγεσία του κόμματος πριν από πέντε χρόνια σε μια προσπάθεια να αλλάξει ριζικά το προφίλ του και να συναγωνιστεί τον χαρισματικό ηγέτη των Εργατικών.

Τα παραπάνω αναφέρονται στην κατάσταση που επικρατούσε στην Αθήνα και το Λονδίνο όχι το 2010, αλλά ακριβώς 40 χρόνια πριν. Η τρίτη επέτειος του πραξικοπήματος της 21ης Απριλίου έβρισκε το καθεστώς απομονωμένο από τους Ευρωπαίους συμμάχους του λόγω της ουσιαστικής αποπομπής της Ελλάδας από το Συμβούλιο της Ευρώπης τον προηγούμενο Δεκέμβριο. Ο Γεώργιος Παπαδόπουλος, πρωθυπουργός, και υπουργός άμυνας και (από το καλοκαίρι και έπειτα και) εξωτερικών, προωθεί το («κυρίως επικοινωνιακό») «άνοιγμα προς Ανατολάς» και το «άνοιγμα προς την Αφρική» της χούντας, ώστε να βελτιώσει το διεθνές κύρος της χώρας που έχει πληγεί σημαντικά. Οι λεγόμενοι «σκληροί» του καθεστώτος (Ιωαννίδης, Λαδάς, Ασλανίδης) αντιδρούν στη συγκέντρωση εξουσιών στο πρόσωπο του Παπαδόπουλου, καθώς και στους χειρισμούς του τελευταίου σχετικά με την κρίση που παρουσιάζεται στις σχέσεις με τον Μακάριο και την απελευθέρωση κρατουμένων, η οποία πραγματοποιείται για να κατευνάσει πρωτίστως τους επικριτές που βρίσκονται στο εξωτερικό. Το καλοκαίρι του 1970, ο Edward Heath γίνεται τελείως ανέλπιστα πρωθυπουργός, έχοντας οδηγήσει τους Συντηρητικούς σε μια από τις μεγαλύτερες εκλογικές εκπλήξεις στην ιστορία της Βρετανίας, και θέτει ως πρωταρχικό του στόχο την είσοδο της χώρας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Οικονομική Κοινότητα.
Η επιστροφή των Τόρηδων στην εξουσία γεννάει μεγάλες προσδοκίες στην χούντα, λόγω της έλλειψης αριστερής πτέρυγας στο εσωτερικό του κόμματος και του μεγάλου ενδιαφέροντος που επιδεικνύουν παραδοσιακά οι Συντηρητικοί για θέματα ασφάλειας και άμυνας. Η Νέα Πολιτεία (όργανο του καθεστώτος) σπεύδει να επισημάνει τη σημασία του εκλογικού αποτελέσματος ως ενδεικτικού του γενικότερου φραγμού στην αριστερή στροφή στην Ευρώπη, και ως δικαίωσης της «Επανάστασης του 1967» που πρώτη συνέλαβε το μήνυμα της εποχής. Στην καλλιέργεια αυτού του κλίματος συντελούν και δηλώσεις Βρετανών αξιωματούχων πως «το γεγονός ότι δεν υπάρχει – ως συνέβαινε με Εργατικούς – αριστερά πτέρυξ δια να δημιουργή προβλήματα, δύναται να χαρακτηρισθή ως ευοίωνον σημείον». Το Λονδίνο, υπό την ασφυκτική πίεση των οικονομικών του δυσκολιών (αλλά και των ΗΠΑ), θεωρούσε ότι ήταν αναγκαία μια πολιτική καλών σχέσεων με το καθεστώς, η οποία θα καταστούσε δυνατή την εντατικοποίηση των εμπορικών συναλλαγών, συμπεριλαμβανομένης και της πώλησης πολεμικού υλικού.
Η ένταση που δημιουργήθηκε στην περιοχή της Μεσογείου τον Σεπτέμβριο του 1970, ισχυροποίησε τη θέση της χούντας, καθώς υπογράμμισε τη σημασία της για την Ατλαντική συμμαχία και φάνηκε να δικαιώνει το επιχείρημα των Βρετανών για στενότερη συνεργασία με την Αθήνα και την πάση θυσία αποφυγή συζήτησης του «ελληνικού ζητήματος» στο ΝΑΤΟ. Ενδεικτική των διαθέσεων της Συντηρητικής κυβέρνησης είναι η σύσκεψη που πραγματοποιήθηκε στα τέλη του μήνα υπό τον υπουργό που ήταν υπεύθυνος για τη διαδικασία εισόδου της Βρετανίας στην ΕΟΚ, Geoffrey Rippon. Εκεί αποφασίστηκε ότι η συνεργασία με την Ελλάδα στον στρατιωτικό τομέα ήταν «ιδιαιτέρως σημαντική» για τη διατήρηση καλών σχέσεων εργασίας με τη χούντα, και ειπώθηκε πως η πρόσφατη συμφωνία του Λονδίνου για την παροχή φρεγατών (και άλλου είδους υλικού για νατοϊκή, αποκλειστικά, χρήση) θα βοηθούσε σ’ αυτό. Το νέο πνεύμα στις ελληνοβρετανικές σχέσεις επισφραγίστηκε με την επίσκεψη του Αναπληρωτή ΥπΕξ Παλαμά στη βρετανική πρωτεύουσα και τη δήλωση του γενικού γραμματέα του Φόρεϊν Όφις, Greenhill ότι η χώρα του ήταν πρόθυμη για «όσο πιο πολύ εμπόριο» με την Ελλάδα, αλλά και με τη συνάντηση Παλαμά -Douglas-Home στη Νέα Υόρκη, τον Οκτώβριο.
Παρά μια σχετική διακύμανση στο επίπεδο των σχέσεων των δύο χωρών (που είχαν κυρίως να κάνουν με δυσκολίες που είχαν κληρονομήσει οι Συντηρητικοί από τη διακυβέρνηση Wilson), η κυβέρνηση Heath κατέστησε σαφείς τις προθέσεις της για θερμότερες σχέσεις με το καθεστώς, διαφοροποιώντας τη θέση της από τους Εργατικούς, και χρησιμοποιώντας ως καταλύτη τη συνεργασία στον αμυντικό τομέα. Τα γεγονότα του 1970 αποτέλεσαν την αφετηρία για την πολιτική των Τόρηδων απέναντι στην χούντα, η οποία είχε πιο ουσιαστικά αποτελέσματα τα επόμενα χρόνια της κοινής πορείας των δύο κυβερνήσεων. Χαρακτηριστικό αυτής της πολιτικής ήταν ο κυνισμός με τον οποίο δεχόταν το Λονδίνο και οι εκπρόσωποί του στην Ελλάδα την κατάσταση στην Αθήνα. Τον επόμενο χρόνο ο Βρετανός πρέσβης στην Ελλάδα Sir Robin Hooper έγραφε προς το Λονδίνο τα εξής:

«Δε βλέπω την Ελλάδα να επιστρέφει σε ένα δημοκρατικό σύστημα διακυβέρνησης όπως αυτό γίνεται αντιληπτό σε δυτικοευρωπαϊκές χώρες για πολλά χρόνια, και η εξέλιξη, ακόμη και με τη μορφή καθοδηγούμενης δημοκρατίας όπως αυτή που φαίνεται να οραματίζονταν οι συνταγματάρχες στο παρελθόν, θα είναι αποδεδειγμένα αργή και αβέβαιη».


*Ο Αλέξανδρος Ναυπλιώτης είναι διδάκτωρ διεθνούς ιστορίας του London School of Economics.

BBC and the fall of the junta

This is a BBC article on the demise of the Greek dictatorship. The article was published on 23rd July 1974.

See also a BBC video of celebrations for the end of military rule here.

Papadopoulos and the British Parliament

In this 1994 article by Richard Clogg you can read how the leader of the Colonels' regime contributed towards cleaning up British political life, by giving 'a powerful boost to the process which culminated in the establishment in 1974 of the Register of Members' Interest'.

Sir Brooks Richards

In this newsreel excerpt Sir Brooks Richards presents his credentials to the President of Greece, General Gizikis, in September 1974.

Brooks Richards succeeded Sir Robin Hooper in what was his second and last post as an ambassador. He stayed in Greece until 1978, when he retired from the Foreign Office.

A few months after the fall of the junta, Brooks Richards admitted that Greece had emerged from
the dictatorship ‘in better shape’ than the British had expected.
He also believed the time had come to revise the state of Anglo-Greek relations, and he suggested a series of ‘quite modest developments’, as a sign of British recognition of the change that had taken
place in Greece.

In this video you can watch him talking in Greek, while he presents the prizes (a trip to London) to the winners of a BBC competition.