Book reviewed in 'Diplomacy & Statecraft'

The latest review of 'Britain and the Greek Colonels' appeared recently in Diplomacy & Statecraft (Volume 25, Issue 2, 2014)

The review is written by Dr Sotiris Rizas (Academy of Athens Modern Greek History Research Centre), author of some of the most well-researched Greek history books on the 1960s and 1970s.

Click here to read the review.

Book reviewed in 'The Cyprus Review'

Another review of 'Britain and the Greek Colonels' appeared recently.

This time Dr Andreas Constandinos (author of 'The Cyprus Crisis: Examining the Role of the British and American Government's During 1974') wrote his opinion on the book for The Cyprus Review (Vol. 25 n. 2, Fall 2013).

Here's a small excerpt:

You can find more info on the journal here.

Book reviewed in the Anglo-Hellenic Review

'Britain and the Greek Colonels' reviewed by Dr William Mallinson for the Anglo-Hellenic Review (No 48, Autumn 2013).
Here's an excerpt:

Dr Mallinson is Lecturer in British History, Literature and Culture at the Ionian University, Corfu and has written extensively on Cyprus and British foreign policy towards the island.

You can find his blog here.

'Britain and the Greek Colonels' reviewed in 'Southeast European and Black Sea Studies'

A review of the book by Dr. Konstantina E. Botsiou was recently published in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2013.


Dr. Konstantina E. Botsiou is an Associate Professor of Modern History and International Politics and Vice Rector for Financial Planning at the University of Peloponnese. 

Here's an excerpt:

'In the mid-1970s, the European Community emerged as a hub organization for the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights. It was widely considered suitable for the role by virtue of its successful democratization and integration since the Second World War. Contemporary events only reinforced that political image. The Helsinki Final Act of August 1975 reflected a mutual East–West intention of rapprochement based on the respect of territorial integrity and human rights. At the same time, Western Europe was celebrating the restoration of democracy in three Mediterranean countries, Greece (1974), Portugal (1974–1975) and Spain (1975–1976). All three of them hastened to apply for EC-membership right after the collapse of dictatorial rule, clearly linking the stabilization of democratic governance with participation in ‘democratic Europe’. Accordingly, the fulfilment of their integration hopes until the mid-1980s underlined the EC’s willingness to accept the linkage, as was to be verified again a few years later in the European Union’s post-Cold War ‘Eastern enlargement’.
The evolution of Europe to the status of a global player in issues of democracy and human rights renders all the more interesting the investigation of defining moments as well as occasions when either the EC/EU or single European states were confronted with critical dilemmas as to the prioritization of ‘democracy’ in the shaping of foreign policy. Both characteristics apply to the period right before the democratization wave in the South of the 1970s. For quite a few years, historians and political scientists have been chiefly examining the transition to democracy as a manifestation of the expanding influence of pro-European forces. More light needs to be shed, however, on the opposite direction, too; namely on the impact of dictatorial rule upon the democratization agenda of various West European countries and, ultimately, the European Community itself. Such research questions are crucial in Alexandros Nafpliotis’ book titled Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War: Britain and the Colonels.
The title is telling of the author’s aim to analyse the rationale behind Britain’s search of a modus vivendi with the Greek military regime between 1967 and 1974. To achieve this goal, he explores a broad spectrum of London’s international objectives and commitments. According to a central theme of the book – originally a doctoral dissertation concluded at the London School of Economics and Political Science – the military dictatorship in Greece unfolded while Britain was rapidly losing economic strength and political leverage both in Europe as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not surprisingly, national security interests and the centrality of NATO are considered to have far outweighed concerns over the political ‘anachronism’ of the junta. The stability of Greece as a NATO-partner was deemed more necessary than interference in Greek affairs for the sake of democratization. [...]'

SocialistResistance reviews 'Britain and the Greek Colonels'

Here you can read a review of the book by Piers Mostyn:
http://socialistresistance.org/5749/britains-smashing-of-greek-democracy

The review is entitled 'Britain’s smashing of Greek democracy' and was published on 30 December 2013.

The British and the 1973 Greek republic referendum

Today marks the 40th anniversary of the 1973 Greek republic referendum.

In this excerpt from my book on Britain and the Colonels, you can see how journalist Mario Modiano, talking to British officials well before the referendum, predicted, with uncanny precision, the exact percentage of the people who would vote 'Yes' to the constitutional changes. 
The fact that both foreign journalists and the British Embassy could so easily provide a accurate estimate of the result well in advance speaks volumes about the genuineness of the referendum.

The last important event of [1973's] ‘pretty gruelling summer’, as far as the domestic scene of Greece was concerned, was the referendum on the amended Greek constitution.

 

The junta had warned the British that they should not judge the referendum by British standards and members of the international press had expressed the certainty that it would be ‘a farce’. Mario Modiano [...] thought that the decision to abolish the monarchy had been taken a long time ago, told the British that the Colonels would not permit a repeat of the results of the 1968 plebiscite, in order to make them appear genuine: ‘If as seems likely they fudged the figures, they were likely to choose a more plausible percentage (like for example 78%)’ (emphasis added).

 

This was also the opinion of some FCO officials who had realized, as early as in June 1973, that there was ‘little doubt as to the outcome of the referendum, although the government, who were believed to be embarrassed by the very high yes-votes in 1968, might prefer a rather smaller percentage in their favour this time’.

The British conceded that it was ‘very easy’ to predict the outcome of the referendum, with the Colonels still controlling the levers of power and not being able to afford to lose.

[...] As [British official J F R] Martin admitted shortly before the referendum, ‘few observers doubt that the figure has been decided in advance to within a few per cent’.

Polling took place on 29 July to approve the new republican constitution and the appointment of Papadopoulos as president (reserving for him exclusive powers over defence, foreign affairs and internal security) and Angelis as vice-president.

The final results showed that ‘yes’ got the 78.4% of the vote, which was considered ‘a respectable looking percentage’ in London.

The British embassy’s own estimate had been 78% (emphasis added).

The British, however, were in no doubt that there had been ‘a good deal of malpractice’, as they were aware that before the referendum the junta had ‘used all its very considerable influence to ensure the desired result’. 

They also did not fail to notice that ‘something perhaps ha[d] changed’, as the regime had been taken by surprise by the strength of feeling against it, and that could result in the toughening of its attitude to palliate the hardliners. 

The British representative concluded his report on the events by writing that ‘one [could] not have much confidence that Greece [was] yet firmly on the road leading back to anything that Western Europe would recognise as democracy’ [pp. 185-186].

Britain and Karamanlis: British reaction to the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974

It has now been thirty-nine years since the fall of the Junta and the restoration of democracy in Greece (triggered by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus). 

In an effort to help shed some more light on the events that transpired during the transition period, I present here a small excerpt from my research on the British reaction to the return of Konstantinos Karmanlis and his swearing-in as prime minister (as it appears on my latest book, Britain and the Greek Colonels).

Ίδρυμα Kωνσταντίνος Γ. Kαραμανλής © Copyright 2013

"[British foreign secretary, James] Callaghan thought that with the arrival of a democratic government in Greece, ‘British policy acquired a new element’, as ‘it was important for the Greek people and for international relations that Greek democracy should be strengthened’. The British thought they should ‘certainly welcome’ the return of Karamanlis (‘a politician of real status with popular following in the country’), but not become ‘over committed’ at that stage to his government, as it was considered able to stay in power only if it could ‘deliver the goods’. The British were content to see that the new government had ‘a strong pro-NATO pro-Western Europe bias’ and had been greeted with relief by supporters of the two major parties.

As [British ambassador in Athens, Sir Robin] Hooper reported to the Foreign Office: ‘[t]he present Government is as good as we are likely to get but it is far from being the “ecumenical” Government which some hoped for after the return of Karamanlis’ (emphasis added).

What troubled him, though, were the negative aspects of Greek political life: ‘The bickering and factionalism endemic in Greek politics has alas begun to reappear, and it is much to be feared that even in the present critical situation the politicians inside the Government will soon start squabbling. Those outside are unlikely to refrain from destructive criticism’ (emphasis added)."

For more information on how Whitehall viewed Karamanlis, visit the pages of the Karamanlis Foundation, where quotes from two British PMs are given:

Ίδρυμα Kωνσταντίνος Γ. Kαραμανλής © Copyright 2013

“The British people welcomed and with profound admiration followed the personal achievement of Mr. Karamanlis and his government in restoring democracy to Greece. If there were a Nobel Prize for Democracy, he who should receive it is Konstantinos Karamanlis.“

Harold Wilson
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

 "He became prime minister at a critical moment in his country’s history, and under his wise and steady leadership democracy was re-established and peace was preserved despite the considerable provocations threatening them. He rendered exceptional services to his homeland and to Europe.” 

James Callaghan
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Golden Dawn leader statement reminiscent of 1960s Greek military dictatorship

The Greek edition of the daily Kathimerini reports that the leader of the far-right party Golden Dawn, which since last year has 18 MPs in the Greek parliament, said that his movement was born 'as sent from God'.

The statement was made last Friday during an event entitled 'Greek History Lessons - The truth about 1821' that took place in a central Athens hotel conference room. 

According to the same source, Golden Dawn also announced the launch of its very own 'Foundation of Geopolitical and Historical Studies'.

See also a recent, relevant entry on The Economist's Charlemagne blog, here.

The statement is reminiscent of the Greek junta's proclamations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, the reference to God is strikingly similar to one the Greek ambassador in London made while talking to British Foreign Secretary Brown in late 1967 (see p. 26 of my book on Britain and the Greek Colonels):

'[...] as far as both countries are loyal to NATO and the western

orientation of Greece is one of the basic policies, for which Britain has

fought, the revolution [sic] should be considered by the British Government

as a gift from God’

 Verykios, London to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Athens, 12.09.1967.

ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ

Αναφορά στο βιβλίο μου από το διαδικτυακό περιοδικό Θέματα Ελληνικής Ιστορίας:

"Britain and the Greek Colonels: Αccommodating the Junta in the Cold War" το νέο βιβλίο του κ. Αλέξανδρου Ναυπλιώτη

Written By φιλίστωρ Ι. Β. Δ. on 20 Ιανουαρίου 2013 | 1/20/2013 04:46:00 μ.μ.

(Σημ Φιλίστωρος: Μια μελέτη από τον κ. Ναυπλιώτη που μοιάζει ιδιαίτερα ενδιαφέρουσα καθώς καταπιάνεται με ένα θέμα που μου φαίνεται πως δεν έχει αναλυθεί επαρκώς ως τώρα στην βιβλιογραφία, ενώ αξιοποιεί μια σειρά από νέα στοιχεία από Βρετανικά και Αμερικανικά έγγραφα που αποχαρακτηρίστηκαν πρόσφατα. Ελπίζουμε να εκδοθεί και στα Ελληνικά το συντομότερο).

Δρ. Αλέξανδρος Ναυπλιώτης*

Στο βιβλίο αυτό ο Αλέξανδρος Ναυπλιώτης εξετάζει τη βρετανική εξωτερική πολιτική απέναντι στην Ελλάδα, αποκαλύπτοντας μια κυρίαρχη αρχή πραγματισμού πάνω απ'όλα. Αυτή είναι η πρώτη συστηματική μελέτη των σχέσεων της Βρετανίας και της χούντας και βασίζεται σε πρόσφατα αποχαρακτηρισμένα βρετανικά και αμερικανικά έγγραφα, καθώς και σε επίσημες ελληνικές πηγές και προσωπικές συνεντεύξεις με πρωταγωνιστές της εποχής. Το βιβλίο είναι μια ολοκληρωμένη ιστορία διεθνούς διπλωματίας και Realpolitik κατά την περίοδο του Ψυχρού Πολέμου. Το παρόν βιβλίο εξετάζει την πολιτική των κυβερνήσεων Ουίλσον και Χηθ ως προς την εγκαθίδρυση και την εδραίωση, αλλά και τις πράξεις της στρατιωτικής δικτατορίας που κατείχε την εξουσία από το 1967 έως το 1974. Επίκεντρο της έρευνας είναι οι διπλωματικές, οικονομικές, πολιτισμικές και αμυντικές σχέσεις των δύο παραδοσιακών συμμάχων. Επιχειρεί επίσης να εξηγήσει τους παράγοντες διαμόρφωσης του «διπλωματικού» χειρισμού της ελληνικής υπόθεσης από τη Βρετανία, εξετάζοντας το γενικό πλαίσιο της «αποποίησης του στάτους παγκόσμιας δύναμης» ως συνέπεια της εγκατάλειψης της «πολιτικής στα Ανατολικά του Σουέζ», και τις σχέσεις των δύο χωρών με τις υπερδυνάμεις και τις περιφερειακές δυνάμεις της εποχής, μέσα στο πλαίσιο του Ψυχρού Πολέμου.

Πιο αναλυτικά, το βιβλίο εξετάζει το κατά πόσον γνώριζε το Λονδίνο για το πραξικόπημα της 21^ης Απριλίου, καθώς και το βαθμό τυχόν συμμετοχής του σε αυτό, και αναλύει κριτικά τη βρετανική αντίδραση στα σημαντικότερα γεγονότα που έλαβαν χώρα κατά την επταετία· πρόκειται για σημαίνουσες εσωτερικές εξελίξεις (όπως η πρόοδος της αποκατάστασης της δημοκρατίας), καθώς και για τις προσπάθειες των Συνταγματαρχών για νομιμοποίηση στο εξωτερικό, με κύριο όργανο τη δημιουργία επαφών με κομμουνιστικές βαλκανικές και αφρικανικές χώρες, αλλά και τις συνέπειες της ένταξης της Βρετανίας στην ΕΟΚ.

Αναλύεται επίσης η επίδραση που άσκησαν στις ελληνο-βρετανικές σχέσεις τόσο γεγονότα στη Βρετανία, όπως η οικονομική κατάσταση και οι εθνικές εκλογές του 1970 και του 1974, όσο και διεθνή συμβάντα, όπως η κυπριακή και η αραβο-ισραηλινή διένεξη (οι επιπτώσεις των οποίων διακρίνονται ακόμη και σήμερα), η σοβιετική εισβολή στην Τσεχοσλοβακία, και η διαδικασία της Ύφεσης και της Ευρωπαϊκής ενοποίησης. Ακόμη, η μελέτη αυτή εξετάζει την πολιτική της Βρετανίας απέναντι στη Χούντα σε συνάρτηση με το εξαιρετικά σημαντικό ζήτημα της συμμετοχής της Ελλάδας στο ΝΑΤΟ και τον αντίκτυπο που είχε αυτό στις σχέσεις Βρετανίας και ΗΠΑ.

*Ο Αλέξανδρος Ναυπλιώτης είναι Διδάκτωρ διεθνούς ιστορίας του London School of Economics and Political Science. Έχει διατελέσει Επισκέπτης Ερευνητής στο Ελληνικό Παρατηρητήριο του ίδιου πανεπιστημίου και ερευνητής στη Διεύθυνση Ιστορίας Στρατού, ενώ έχει διδάξει επί σειρά ετών ιστορία διεθνών σχέσεων στο LSE. Άρθρα του έχουν δημοσιευθεί σε γνωστές ακαδημαϊκές επιθεωρήσεις και ιστορικά περιοδικά όπως το European Review of History – Revue européenne d’histoire, το Journal of Modern Greek Studies, το European History Quarterly, το Cold War History, το "Δελτίο του Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών", τα "Ιστορικά Θέματα" και άλλα, και έχει βραβευθεί από την Ελληνική Κοινότητα Λονδίνου για τη διατριβή του με θέμα τις σχέσεις Βρετανίας και Ελλάδας την περίοδο της δικτατορίας των Συνταγματαρχών. 

Σχετικοί υπερσύνδεσμοι:

http://britainandthecolonels.blogspot.co.uk/

http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/publications/books/2012/BritainAndTheGreekColonels.aspx

http://alexnaf.wordpress.com/about/

Book featured on LSE website

My book on Britain and the Greek Colonels' regime is featured on the Main page of the London School of Economics and Political Science under 'New books' by LSE academics.

See more information (including a review by Dr Sotiris Rizas), here.


The book is also featured on the webpage of LSE's International History Department.

Publication of the book

The cover of the book

My first book (largely based on my PhD research), on British foreign policy towards Greece in the turbulent late 1960s and early 1970s, has now been published.

Here’s the description of the book:

At the apex of international Cold War tension, an alliance of Greek military leaders seized power in Athens. Seven years of violent political repression followed in Greece, yet, as Cold War allies, the Greek colonels had continued international support – especially from Britain. Why did the Wilson and Heath governments choose to pursue an alliance with these military dictators? Alexandros Nafpliotis’ book examines British foreign policy towards Greece, exposing a guiding principle of pragmatism above all else. This is the first systematic study of Britain and the Junta to be based on newly-released National Archive documents, US and Greek sources and personal interviews with leading actors. Britain and the Greek Colonels is a comprehensive history of international diplomacy and realpolitik in the Cold War period.

You can order the book by visiting the I.B.Tauris website:
http://www.ibtauris.com/

Mario Modiano, former Times correspondent in Athens dies

Sad news as former Times correspondent in Athens, Mario Modiano, died at 86.

According to ekathimerini.com:

'Modiano was a well-known chronicler of some of the key moments of Greek history, such as the military dictatorship, the restoration of democracy and the separation of Cyprus'.

He was not loved by the junta because he related in great detail cases of systematic torture of jailed opponents.

You can find an obituary written in The Times, here - and another one, published in the Daily Telegraph, here.

You can read a very interesting interview of his, where he recounts the story of his family's arrival to Greece, as well as his personal experience of the German occupation and the Greek Colonels' regime, here.

A more in depth account of the events immediately after the collapse of the regime can be found in this article he wrote a year ago.

Modiano in Greece - telegraph.co.uk

In this excerpt from my forthcoming book, you can see how Modiano, talking to British officials well before the 1973 Greek republic referendum, predicted, with uncanny precision, the exact percentage of the people who would vote 'Yes' to the constitutional changes.

The fact that both foreign journalists and the British Embassy could so easily provide a accurate estimate of the result well in advance speaks volumes about the genuineness of the referendum.

The last important event of [1973's] ‘pretty gruelling summer’, as far as the domestic scene of Greece was concerned, was the referendum on the amended Greek constitution.

The junta had warned the British that they should not judge the referendum by British standards and members of the international press had expressed the certainty that it would be ‘a farce’. Mario Modiano [...] thought that the decision to abolish the monarchy had been taken a long time ago, told the British that the Colonels would not permit a repeat of the results of the 1968 plebiscite, in order to make them appear genuine: ‘If as seems likely they fudged the figures, they were likely to choose a more plausible percentage (like for example 78%)’ (emphasis added).

This was also the opinion of some FCO officials who had realized, as early as in June 1973, that there was ‘little doubt as to the outcome of the referendum, although the government, who were believed to be embarrassed by the very high yes-votes in 1968, might prefer a rather smaller percentage in their favour this time’.

The British conceded that it was ‘very easy’ to predict the outcome of the referendum, with the Colonels still controlling the levers of power and not being able to afford to lose.

[...] As [British official J F R] Martin admitted shortly before the referendum, ‘few observers doubt that the figure has been decided in advance to within a few per cent’.

Polling took place on 29 July to approve the new republican constitution and the appointment of Papadopoulos as president (reserving for him exclusive powers over defence, foreign affairs and internal security) and Angelis as vice-president.

The final results showed that ‘yes’ got the 78.4% of the vote, which was considered ‘a respectable looking percentage’ in London.

The British embassy’s own estimate had been 78% (emphasis added).

UK and Human Rights abroad

As you can see by reading this article that was published today on the BBC NEWS website,
The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has accused the UK government  of inconsistency in its dealings with other countries over human rights.

According to the BBC:

The committee accepted it was "inevitable" that there would be occasional conflicts between the UK's strategic, commercial or security-related interests and its human rights values and a "balance" had to be struck.

The report reads: "In our view, it would be in the government's interest for it to be more transparent in acknowledging that there will be contradictions in pursuing these interests while promoting human rights values.

The government's role should be publicly to set out and explain its judgements on how far to balance the two in particular cases, having taken into account the need to adapt policy according to local circumstances and developments."

You can find the full report (as well as FCO's response) here.

The 2011 report mentioned above focuses on the UK's (apparently inconsistent) dealings with Ukraine and Bahrain.

If you're interested in some historical context, the British government's 'inconsistency' in relation to the case of the Greek Colonels' regime is highlighted in my forthcoming book.

To give you an idea, this is from the conclusion of the first chapter (pp. 41-42):

"All in all, the British stance towards the dictatorship of the Colonels, during the first two years could be characterised as one of ambiguity.  

London hesitated in almost every decision it had to take, oscillating between the two poles of its policy: namely, (1) protecting its mainly commercial and strategic interests and its ‘special relationship’ with Washington, and (2) upholding human rights and promoting a return to democratic rule, basically through trying to influence the regime and sustaining some efforts of the opposition. The initial inertia of the Labour government soon changed to a pragmatic policy of establishing relations with the junta, without, however, appearing to be too close to Greece’s military dictators. The catalyst for this change were three events that took place in 1967; the Six Day War, the crisis in Cyprus, and the failed royal counter-coup. The first demonstrated Greece’s augmented significance as a NATO ally in a troubled region, the second proved to the British the value of keeping closer relations with the Greek leaders, and the third confirmed the consolidation of the regime. When 1968 came and Britain recognized the junta anew, it became clear that, despite some instances of criticism of the dictatorship -mainly for public consumption- London was willing to make use of ‘different tactics’ in order to safeguard its (chiefly commercial and strategic) interests vis-à-vis Greece. The impact of international events was once again decisive as the Prague Spring and increased Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean were conducive to a reconsideration of British policy towards the Colonels and the adoption of a ‘business as usual’ approach, thus acting as a prelude to the new era of relations that was soon to follow."

UK Arms Export Policy- Now and then

The Committees on Arms Export Controls has published today a report saying that the UK government should apply significantly more cautious judgements on the export of arms to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression.

Taken from conservatives.com

The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley (who firstly became an MP a few months before the junta's fall in 1974) said:

"This is a ground breaking Report in the depth and detail of the Committees on Arms Export Controls' scrutiny of the Government’s policies on arms exports.

The Foreign Secretary in his Oral evidence to the Committee confirmed that the British Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression was as follows:

The long-standing British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."

This reminded me of the situation vis-a-vis providing arms to the Greek dictatorship of the 1960s-1970s.

Recently released FCO documents reveal that during the discussions of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 30 January 1969 on arms policy towards Greece, it was decided that Britain ‘should in principle permit the supply to Greece of arms which she could reasonably be expected to require in order to fulfil her NATO role’ and that only the supply of those arms intended to repress the civilian population should be prohibited.

But how exactly did Whitehall handle this conundrum?

Here's how I analyse it in my forthcoming book (pp. 246-7):

Arms sales to Greece was [a] highly controversial issue-no less so due to prior complications over trade with South Africa. The Wilson government drew a distinction (similar to the one employed vis-à-vis the apartheid regime), whereby large items which could be used for NATO purposes, such as tanks, could be exported, whereas ‘light’ items, like grenades and small rifles, which could be used for internal repression could not be sold to Athens. The Labour government tried to handle this delicate and potentially explosive question in strict confidence, thus exemplifying its twofold policy of keeping relations with the Colonels on a satisfactory level and at the same time avoiding hostile criticism, especially within parliament. This ‘combination of high-minded principle and arms sales’, as one member of the Cabinet termed it, provided an impetus for attacks on Whitehall (for the most part from its left wing), which defended its choices by returning to the Leitmotif of the dismal financial situation of Britain that was in desperate need of exports, and the importance of the arms industry with regard to the jobs it provided.



FCO photo taken from news.bbc.co.uk

Consequently, when the Conservatives came to power, a continuation of the status quo concerning arms sales was the minimum expected. In fact, the Heath government used its predecessor’s policy as a springboard for the active promotion of sales in order to boost its trade with Greece. London made its desire to sell arms to the junta more distinct, by arranging the exchange of visits of people involved, on a variety of levels, in arms sales. Most importantly, British ministers kept reiterating their willingness to provide frigates and, after an initial numbness, even tanks to the military dictatorship in Athens, in a policy that culminated in Lord Carrington’s visit to the Greek capital. Despite Whitehall’s active policy of attracting arms deals, sales seldom materialized. FCO documents reveal that the British attributed that to the ‘Byzantine style of negotiations’ of the Greeks and their unwillingness to appear to ‘go other than American’. Greek documents show that the junta was more interested in appearing to be in negotiations with the British (in order to enhance its international respectability) than proceed with sales, for the additional reason that, in the most significant cases (such as the frigates), Athens lacked the necessary funds. Therefore, while Britain was preoccupied with supporting its arms industry and generally improving its trade in a desperate effort to reverse its financial decline, the Greeks’ main concern was to use any contracts secured for political exploitation.