Book reviewed in 'The Cyprus Review'

Another review of 'Britain and the Greek Colonels' appeared recently.

This time Dr Andreas Constandinos (author of 'The Cyprus Crisis: Examining the Role of the British and American Government's During 1974') wrote his opinion on the book for The Cyprus Review (Vol. 25 n. 2, Fall 2013).

Here's a small excerpt:

You can find more info on the journal here.

1974 Cypriot coup d'état

Yesterday was the 39th anniversary of the 1974 Cypriot coup d'état.

What follow are small excerpts (taken from my recently published book on Britain and the Greek Colonels) which examines the British reaction to the coup and Whitehall's immediate actions on that day:

"[...] The first reports about outbreaks of fighting in Nicosia reached London on 15 July. According to information gained during the first hours, it was looking ‘increasingly like a coup organised by Greek contingent/Greek-officered elements of National Guard’. The most shocking news appeared to be the alleged death of Archbishop Makarios, broadcast by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and conveyed to London by the British high commissioner, Olver.

From http://grhomeboy.wordpress.com 

[...] Callaghan admitted that the treaty gave Britain rights but appeared less urgent to suggest any concrete action as it was too early to judge the situation fully.

[As he told the House of Commons:] We are in the very early hours of this event. It happened only this morning. A declaration has been put out by those who led the coup saying that foreign policy will not change and that Cyprus will maintain friendly relations with all nations while pursuing a policy of non-alignment as happened in the past. I do not know how much reliance at this stage we should attach to any of the declarations that are forthcoming.

[...] In order to help defuse the crisis the foreign secretary prepared a telegram detailing directions to British representatives in Athens, Ankara, Washington, Brussels, and New York. His message to his Greek counterpart expressed his ‘grave concern’ over the situation: ‘[. . . ] it is undoubtedly very dangerous with serious implications for the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and for the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. I am sure you share my concern that the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus should be maintained.
I should be grateful to have urgently your comments on the situation as the Greek Government sees it’.

A similar message was to be delivered to the Turkish capital as well, with the hope that the Turks would avoid ‘any kind of precipitate action or intervention’ at that stage, as it was ‘clearly essential’, if the conflict was not to spread, for the Turkish government to display ‘exemplary patience’ in those circumstances. Washington was to be informed about the content of the two messages, and Dr Kissinger to be approached with an oral message from Callaghan asking his view, any information on action which he might contemplate, and any information on events on the island itself. The British delegation to NATO was asked to invite Dr Luns himself to consider sending messages to the Turks and the Greeks, and the British mission at the UN was told to suggest to Dr Waldheim the convening of an emergency meeting of the contributors to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)."

UK and Human Rights abroad

As you can see by reading this article that was published today on the BBC NEWS website,
The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has accused the UK government  of inconsistency in its dealings with other countries over human rights.

According to the BBC:

The committee accepted it was "inevitable" that there would be occasional conflicts between the UK's strategic, commercial or security-related interests and its human rights values and a "balance" had to be struck.

The report reads: "In our view, it would be in the government's interest for it to be more transparent in acknowledging that there will be contradictions in pursuing these interests while promoting human rights values.

The government's role should be publicly to set out and explain its judgements on how far to balance the two in particular cases, having taken into account the need to adapt policy according to local circumstances and developments."

You can find the full report (as well as FCO's response) here.

The 2011 report mentioned above focuses on the UK's (apparently inconsistent) dealings with Ukraine and Bahrain.

If you're interested in some historical context, the British government's 'inconsistency' in relation to the case of the Greek Colonels' regime is highlighted in my forthcoming book.

To give you an idea, this is from the conclusion of the first chapter (pp. 41-42):

"All in all, the British stance towards the dictatorship of the Colonels, during the first two years could be characterised as one of ambiguity.  

London hesitated in almost every decision it had to take, oscillating between the two poles of its policy: namely, (1) protecting its mainly commercial and strategic interests and its ‘special relationship’ with Washington, and (2) upholding human rights and promoting a return to democratic rule, basically through trying to influence the regime and sustaining some efforts of the opposition. The initial inertia of the Labour government soon changed to a pragmatic policy of establishing relations with the junta, without, however, appearing to be too close to Greece’s military dictators. The catalyst for this change were three events that took place in 1967; the Six Day War, the crisis in Cyprus, and the failed royal counter-coup. The first demonstrated Greece’s augmented significance as a NATO ally in a troubled region, the second proved to the British the value of keeping closer relations with the Greek leaders, and the third confirmed the consolidation of the regime. When 1968 came and Britain recognized the junta anew, it became clear that, despite some instances of criticism of the dictatorship -mainly for public consumption- London was willing to make use of ‘different tactics’ in order to safeguard its (chiefly commercial and strategic) interests vis-à-vis Greece. The impact of international events was once again decisive as the Prague Spring and increased Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean were conducive to a reconsideration of British policy towards the Colonels and the adoption of a ‘business as usual’ approach, thus acting as a prelude to the new era of relations that was soon to follow."

FT article on geopolitical ramifications of Greek election

In this article the Financial Times Europe editor claims that the stakes in Sunday's Greek election are 'geopolitical rather than financial'.

Both New Democracy and Syriza's flirting with Russia and other non-EU, non-NATO countries, as well as the 'disarray of Greece's foreign ministry', are highlighted.

Tony Barber - taken from http://stateoftheunion.eui.eu/

This proposed re-orientation (or 'diversification' if you like) of Greek foreign policy (to the extent it is put forward and to the degree it is possible) is reminiscent of an era, up until now considered long gone, when Greece was outside the EU and was facing isolation from the West.

Tony Barber points to the Greeks' disillusionment with the West by making a reference to the Greek junta:

Although younger Greeks are proud of their modern European identity, half of them today are unemployed and fearful for their future. Older Greeks, meanwhile, remember Nato’s decision to stay on the sidelines when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 – as well as what they recall as US support for the 1967-74 Greek military junta.

Ioannidis, Cyprus, and the irony of history

Dimitrios Ioannidis, one of the instigators of the April 1967 coup that brought the Greek Colonels to power, died early in the morning today.
During the seven-year reign of the 'junta', Brigadier Ioannidis was director of the Greek military police (ΕΣΑ), and he was known as one of the hardliners of the regime.
He rose to prominence in November 1973, when he masterminded, behind the scenes, a new coup that put an end to the liberalising efforts initiated by Georgios Papadopoulos, under the so-called 'Markezinis experiment'.

History showed its ironic face once again, as the 'invisible dictator' (as he was known during 1973-4) passed away on the 50th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Cyprus.
Ioannidis' fate was tied to the Mediterranean island.

The Cyprus issue, which eventually brought about the demise of the
military junta, was the most predominant foreign policy preoccupation of all the
dictators (and especially of Ioannidis) throughout their tenure of power, for they
thought that, as Coufoudakis has argued, ‘removing this irritant from Greek domestic and foreign policy and interallied
relations, was expected to increase the Colonels' prestige at home and end the
régime’s international isolation’.

The first signs appeared in the summer of 1970, when a crisis was brewing up on the island, also as a consequence of the attempted assassination of President Makarios earlier that year.
Papadopoulos' handling of the situation in Cyprus, in conjunction with
his initiatives in trying to mitigate foreign critics through
pursuing a conciliatory line precipitated cracks within the junta, which appeared
at that time to be far from united. The internal troubles peaked in the summer of 1970
when Papadopoulos (who was already both prime minister and minister of defence)
decided, following Pipinelis’ death, to assume the post of minister of foreign affairs,
as well. Jealously prevailed among Papadopoulos’ critics, with the concentration of
power in his hands being the real issue. The casualties of the acute internal crisis,
which was resolved in September, were the prime minister’s ability to confront the
hardliners and his supposed efforts towards the gradual democratisation of the
régime.

When, in November 1973, a coup overthrew Papadopoulos, the British were quick to identify Ioannidis as the ‘somewhat shadowy figure’ behind the new government.
As a consequence of developments in Greece, however, the British decided to adopt once more a
wait-and-see policy, with greater caution dictated by parliamentary attitudes that were
unfavourable to Ioannidis.

A few months later, and before celebrating fifteen years as an independent state, the Republic of Cyprus would cease to exist in its initial form.
The coup that the Greek junta, under Ioannidis, launched against Makarios triggered a invasion by Turkey, which still occupies the northern third of Cyprus today, thus dividing the island.

The actions of the dictator that precipitated the division of Cyprus came back to haunt him; according to the dictates of historical irony, the 16th of August will from now on mark both the beginning of the Republic of Cyprus and the end of the man who tried to dismantle it.

Photos taken from http://www.tovima.gr/ and http://www.windowoncyprus.com/.

When Greece won the World Cup

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus on the 20th of July served as the final catalyst
for the events set in motion by the coup against Makarios, inasmuch as it spelled
disaster for the objectives of the Greek junta regarding the island, and it marked the
end of the military dictatorship in Greece. Only a couple of days
later, while the British were preoccupied with the Geneva conference on Cyprus,
reports reached London that the junta was about to fall and that Gizikis had
summoned ‘old’ politicians (Mavros, Canellopoulos, Markezinis, Stephanopoulos,
Zolotas, Averoff, Palamas, and Garoufalias were mentioned) to discuss the formation
of a civilian government.

The scenes of ‘extraordinary jubilation’ in the centre of Athens
(which, according to British ambassador Hooper, was reacting ‘very much as though Greece had won the World Cup’)
intensified even further after the announcement that the military junta would hand
power over to a political administration, and euphoria culminated upon Karamanlis’
arrival in the wee hours of the following day, with the crowd calling on him to ‘save
Greece’. Shortly before that pro-Enosis demonstrators had smashed the windows
of the British embassy in Athens.

Karamanlis was immediately sworn in as prime minister and, as a result, the
British ambassador was instructed to deliver him a message (highly indicative of London’s satisfaction over the change in Athens and its concern and sense of urgency
over Cyprus) from Wilson:

'I am delighted at the news that you have taken office as Prime Minister. Please
accept my warmest congratulations. I have no doubt that your high reputation as an
international statesman and your long experience will make an invaluable contribution
at this critical time. I am sure that you will agree that it is of paramount importance that talks between the parties concerned in the Cyprus dispute should start as quickly as possible. I hope that you will be able to send a member of your government to Geneva tomorrow.'

The new Greek prime minister’s reply was in the same spirit:

'[…] In the difficult task of restoring and consolidating democracy in Greece the
eradication of the unfavourable consequences for Cyprus of the recent crisis shall play
a vital role. I am sure that I can rely on your personal understanding and assistance in
this respect. Sharing your feelings about the importance of the talks, the
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Cyprus should
start as soon as possible, I am sending Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Mavros to
Geneva where he will be arriving tomorrow afternoon'.

Callaghan thought that with the arrival of a democratic government in Greece,
‘British policy acquired a new element’, as ‘it was important for the Greek people and
for international relations that Greek democracy should be strengthened’. The
British thought they should ‘certainly welcome’ the return of Karamanlis, but not become ‘over
committed’ at that stage to his government, as it was considered able to stay in power only if it could ‘deliver the goods’. The British were content to see that the new
government had ‘a strong pro-NATO pro-Western Europe bias’ and had been greeted
with relief by supporters of the two major parties. As Hooper reported to FCO:

‘[t]he present Government is as good as we are likely to get but it is far from being
the “ecumenical” Government which some hoped for after the return of Karamanlis’.

What troubled him, though, were the negative aspects of Greek
political life:

‘The bickering and factionalism endemic in Greek politics has alas
begun to reappear, and it is much to be feared that even in the present critical situation
the politicians inside the Government will soon start squabbling. Those outside are
unlikely to refrain from destructive criticism’.

The foreign secretary commenting
on the events on Cyprus in his memoirs wrote the following:

‘Nevertheless, when I look back on that fateful and absorbing period there were some
rewards. Democratic government in Greece was an uncovenanted bonus and I believe
Britain did a great deal to assist its consolidation in those first days of uncertainty’.

The 25 November 1973 coup d'etat

35 years ago yesterday another coup d'etat took place in Greece.
In the aftermath of the Athens Polytechnic uprising, head of the military police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis toppled Papadopoulos and installed Lieutenant General Phaedon Gizikis as President of Greece.
Ioannidis came to be known as the 'invisible dictator' because he was the one pulling the strings during the last period of the Colonels' regime which ended with the Cyprus coup d'etat in July 1974 and the Turkish invasion of the island.

Dimitrios Ioannides (right) toasting with George Papadopoulos (middle) and Phaedon Gizikis (left) Ioannides and Gizikis overthrew Papadopoulos in a later coup.

The communique announcing the overthrow of the Markezinis government accused Papadopoulos of 'straying from the ideals of the 1967 revolution and 'pushing the country towards parliamentary rule too quickly'.

Here you can read BBC's report on these events.

The photos on the right are from an article of the London press on the British recognition of Ioannides' regime.

[You can also read an article (in Greek) on Ioannidis, Kissinger and the USA here.]